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Abstract 
We predict how our actions will influence the world around us. Prevailing models in the 
action control literature propose that we use these predictions to suppress or ‘cancel’ 
perception of expected action outcomes, to highlight more informative surprising events. 
However, contrasting normative Bayesian models in sensory cognition suggest that we are 
more, not less, likely to perceive what we expect – given that what we expect is more likely 
to occur. Here we adjudicated between these models by investigating how expectations 
influence perceptual decisions about action outcomes in a signal detection paradigm. Across 
three experiments, participants performed one of two manual actions that were sometimes 
accompanied by brief presentation of expected or unexpected visual outcomes. Contrary to 
dominant cancellation models but consistent with Bayesian accounts, we found that observers 
were biased to report the presence of expected action outcomes. There were no effects of 
expectation on sensitivity. Computational modelling revealed that the action-induced bias 
reflected a sensory bias in how evidence was accumulated rather than a baseline shift in 
decision circuits. Expectation effects remained in Experiments 2 and 3 when orthogonal cues 
indicated which finger was more likely to be probed (i.e., task-relevant). These biases 
towards perceiving expected action outcomes are suggestive of a mechanism that would 
enable generation of largely veridical representations of our actions and their consequences in 
an inherently uncertain sensory world.  
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1. Introduction 
Effectively acting on the world around us requires predicting the consequences of our actions 
(James, 1890). We select actions based on their predicted outcomes and use these predictions 
to generate rapid corrective movements when we experience deviant sensory input (Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001; Wolpert, Ghahramani & Jordan, 1995). Influential 
‘Cancellation’ models in the action control literature propose that we also use these 
predictions to suppress perception of expected sensory inputs, across sensory modalities 
(Bays & Wolpert, 2007; Blakemore et al., 1998; Fiehler, Brenner & Spering, 2019; Kilteni & 
Ehrsson, 2017; Kilteni, Houborg & Ehrsson, 2019; see also Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Fig. 
1a). Such a mechanism would allow us to ignore predictable sensations and therefore remain 
maximally sensitive to more behaviourally-relevant unexpected events. Such cancellation 
models provide an appealing explanation for why it is difficult to tickle oneself (Weiskrantz, 
Elliott & Darlington, 1971). The idea has also drawn wide support from studies showing that 
sensory events predictably resulting from action are perceived as less intense than similar 
events presented in the absence of action (Bays, Wolpert & Flanagan, 2005; Sato, 2008). 
Indeed, interest in cancellation mechanisms has been galvanised by studies suggesting an 
intimate link between such effects and the feelings of control that accompany out movements 
(the ‘sense of agency’), with dysfunctions of cancellation associated with pathologies of 
agency in a variety of psychiatric conditions (Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000). 
However, the core principle guiding Cancellation models – that perception of predicted 
inputs is suppressed – contrasts with prominent Bayesian models in the wider sensory 
cognition literature (Fig. 1b). These models suggest that we are more, not less, likely to 
perceive what we expect (de Lange, Heilbron & Kok, 2018; Press & Yon, 2019). They 
emphasise how in an inherently ambiguous sensory world it is adaptive for organisms to 
combine sampled sensory evidence with prior knowledge about what is likely to occur. 
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Mechanistically this can be achieved by altering the weights on sensory channels, by 
increasing the ‘gain’ of expected relative to unexpected signals (de Lange et al., 2018; 
Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). Increasing the gain afforded to expected sensory signals in 
this fashion – effectively ‘turning up the volume’ of events that conform to our prior 
predictions – would bias perceptual processing and predispose observers to perceive events 
that they expect to occur (e.g., Wyart, Nobre & Summerfield, 2012; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis 
& Bach, 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, Ellis & Bach, 2016). For example, a range of 
curious illusory phenomena – such as the tendency of observers to perceive concave faces as 
convex (Gregory, 1997) – could arise via such mechanisms. Importantly, while these kinds of 
biases may lead to occasional misperceptions, they may nonetheless reflect an adaptive and 
efficient way of generating veridical percepts, since expected events are – by definition – 
more likely to occur. While these models have been developed outside of action contexts, a 
mechanism that biases perception in line with expectations could be just as adaptive during 
action. For example, if we are trying to flick the light switch in a darkened room, we will 
generate more veridical estimates of our ongoing actions if we are biased to perceive 
expected events (e.g. the sight of a moving hand).   
Cancellation and Bayesian accounts of how predictions shape perception have been difficult 
to compare directly because experimental approaches differ between disciplines (Press, Kok 
& Yon, 2020b). Support for Bayesian models within the normative sensory cognition 
literature typically examines an organism’s ability to detect a low intensity stimulus (Stein & 
Peelen, 2015; Wyart, Nobre & Summerfield, 2012). In contrast, action studies reporting 
cancellation have typically asked participants to judge the intensity of action outcomes (Bays 
et al., 2005; Blakemore et al., 1998; Kilteni, Houborg & Ehrsson, 2019; Sato, 2008; Weiss, 
Herwig & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; see also Yon & Press, 2017, 2018). To render the 
paradigms more comparable the present series of perceptual experiments used a signal 
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detection paradigm within the domain of action (see also Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; Schwarz 
et al., 2018). They also presented visual action outcomes, given that both Cancellation and 
Bayesian theories hypothesise comparable operation of mechanisms across sensory 
modalities (Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards & Friston, 2013; Wolpert, Doya & Kawato, 
2003) and that visual events have been used more commonly in the normative sensory 
cognition literature (see General Discussion).   
 
Fig. 1: A schematic illustration of how predictive signals influence activation of sensory units under 
Cancellation and Bayesian models, alongside their putative influences on perception. Cancellation models 
developed in the action literature (a, left) hypothesise that when we move (e.g., depress our index finger) we 
generate a predictive signal that suppresses activity in sensory units tuned to expected perceptual outcomes (e.g. 
visual units tuned to the sight of a hand with a depressed index finger). Weakening activity in these units 
reduces the signal-to-noise ratio of the sensory population – leading to less intense percepts and biasing 
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observers away from perceiving these outcomes (b, left). In contrast, Bayesian models developed in the wider 
sensory cognition literature (a, right) suggest that predictive signals alter the weights on sensory channels such 
that the volume is ‘turned up’ (e.g., the gain is increased) on expected relative to unexpected signals. Such 
weighting leads to a higher signal-to-noise ratio when expectations are valid, leading to more intense percepts 
and biases towards perceiving expected outcomes (b, right).  
Participants produced manual actions (abducting their index or middle finger) and detected 
visual action outcomes, which could be congruent or incongruent with their own movement. 
This congruency manipulation exploits the fact that congruent action outcomes will be more 
expected than incongruent ones, based either on inherited evolutionary expectations or our 
extensive experience of controlling our actions (Hommel et al., 2001). Under Cancellation 
models, suppressing activity in units tuned to expected stimuli should make it harder for 
predictable action outcomes to reach detection threshold (see Fig. 1), making observers either 
less sensitive to these events or biased to report that they did not occur. In contrast, under 
normative Bayesian models selectively increasing the relative weight on expected sensory 
channels should either bias observers to report that congruent events occurred or make them 
more sensitive to congruent outcomes. However, given recent findings in the broader sensory 
cognition literature, we anticipated that sensitising sensory channels tuned to expected events 
would increase hits and also false alarms – in signal detection terms, biasing observers rather 
than increasing their sensitivity (Wyart et al., 2012). We subsequently used computational 
modelling to pinpoint which aspect of perceptual decision making is influenced by 
expectations.  
 
2. Experiment 1: How do actions influence detection of expected outcomes? 
2.1. Methods 
2.1.1. Participants 
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Twenty-four healthy participants (19 female, 5 male, mean age = 24.9 years, SD = 5.38) took 
part in Experiment 1. All participants in all experiments reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and no history of psychiatric or neurological illness. A sample size of 24 
participants per experiment was selected such that each would have at least 80% power to 
detect a medium-sized effect of action-outcome congruency on perceptual decisions (Cohen's 
dz = .6, N=24, alpha =0.05 provides 80.3% power - G*Power 3.1.9.2). All experiments were 
approved by the local ethics committee at Birkbeck, University of London. 
2.1.2. Procedure 
The experiment took place in a dimly lit testing cubicle. Participants sat ~55 cm from the 
monitor (153 x 32 cm, 60 Hz) used for stimulus presentation, with their hands placed above 
two keypads. The participant’s right hand was rotated 90°, such that their knuckles were 
aligned with the body midline. Each trial began with the presentation of a greyscale avatar 
hand (Poser 10, Smith Micro Software). This image remained on screen until participants 
executed either an index or little finger tapping action - depressing the relevant key. 
Movements were freely-selected, but the experiment ran until participants executed at least 
100 of each type. On 50% of trials, participant’s actions triggered a synchronous movement 
of the onscreen hand (signal present) that was displayed for 17 ms. On the remaining 50% of 
trials the hand remained still (signal absent). On signal present trials, half of observed 
movements were congruent with the participant’s own action (e.g. execute index tap, observe 
index tap), and half were incongruent (e.g. execute index tap, observe middle tap). Regardless 
of signal presence, the index and middle region of the avatar hand was backwards-masked by 
an oval texture comprised of avatar fingers (Cutting, Moore & Morrison, 1988) for 100 ms. 
This image was in turn followed by a visual white noise mask presented for 300-600 ms. 
Participants were subsequently asked about the movement of one of the two fingers (e.g. did 
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the INDEX finger move?). They registered their decision with a button press with their left 
thumb. On half of trials participants were probed about the congruent finger of the avatar 
hand (i.e. the index finger if they moved their index finger), and on the remaining half the 
incongruent finger was probed. Participants in Experiment 1 also made a confidence 
judgement about their decision (‘high confidence’ or ‘low confidence’) to collect pilot data 
for an additional experiment. 
Participants completed at least 200 trials1. Trial types were randomised across the experiment 
and breaks were taken every 40 trials. Before the main experiment participants completed a 
short practice block which familiarised them with the main task (16 trials). Participants 
subsequently completed a longer practice block without producing actions where they 
completed a 1 up – 1 down adaptive staircase, to adjust the difficulty of the perceptual 
discrimination such that it was approximately matched for all participants. This staircase 
targeted the amount of observed finger movement (minimum 1° rotation around the 
metacarpophalangeal joint, maximum 16°) that was required for detection on ~50% of trials. 
The staircase terminated after 12 reversals, and the average of the last six turning points was 
taken as an estimate of the participant’s threshold. The main experiment began after 
completing the adaptive staircase, and test stimuli (when present) were shown at this 
threshold value on all subsequent trials.  
2.2. Results and Discussion 
All tests in all experiments used an alpha level of .05, and for non-significant results we 
calculated Bayes Factors to quantify evidence for the absence of an effect (i.e. the null 
hypothesis; Dienes, 2014). Separate signal detection theoretic measures of sensitivity (d’) and 
 
1 Participants in Experiment 1 were successful in following the instruction to execute roughly equal numbers of 
each action, and therefore completed on average 218 trials (SEM = 2.5), comprising on average 49.8 % 
congruent trials (SEM=.0014).  
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bias (c) were calculated using hit rates and false alarm rates on congruent and incongruent 
trials. d’ reflects the extent to which participants are more likely to report the presence of a 
stimulus when it is present than when it is absent (d’ = z[hit rate] – z[false alarm rate]), while 
c reflects the extent to which participants are more likely to respond ‘present’ or ‘absent’ 
regardless of objective stimulus presence ( c = -.05[z(hit rate) + z(false alarm rate)]. For some 
participants in some conditions response counts were empty (e.g., no misses) which can 
preclude calculation of d’ and c. In line with previous recommendations (Hautus, 1995) this 
issue was overcome by adjusting counts of hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections by 
+.5 in all experiments, and this adjustment was applied to all participants to avoid introducing 
biases into group-level analyses (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).  
Sensitivity and bias on congruent and incongruent trials were compared using t-tests. These 
analyses revealed that participants were more liberal in reporting the presence of congruent 
action outcomes (lower c – t23 = 2.35, p=.028, dz = .480; see Fig. 2) and were also more 
sensitive when judgements probed the congruent finger (higher d’ – t23 = 2.29, p=.031, dz = 
.467; see Table 1). These findings are predicted by the Bayesian account and inconsistent 
with the Cancellation account. 
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Fig. 2: Action execution and detection task, with signal detection c results from Experiments 1-3. a. Participants 
performed actions, which were paired with synchronous congruent or incongruent movements of an avatar hand 
that they were required to detect. In Experiments 2 and 3, attentional arrow cues also informed participants 
about which finger of the avatar hand was likely to be probed. b. We calculated the signal detection theoretic 
measure c to index biases induced by action. These values were lower (i.e. responses were more liberal) on 
congruent (saturated) relative to incongruent (desaturated) trials, irrespective of attentional focus. This effect 
demonstrates that perceptual decisions were biased towards expected action outcomes. Error bars show 95% 
within-participant confidence intervals of the mean difference between conditions. 
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Table 1: Mean (SD) sensitivity (d’) values across all conditions in Experiments 1-3 
 
3. Experiment 2: Dissociating effects of expectation and attention on detection 
performance 
Experiment 1 found that participants were more sensitive to (higher d’) and biased to report 
the presence of (lower c) congruent action outcomes. However, one possibility is that these 
results reflect effects of ‘attention’ rather than ‘expectation’ per se. That is, in both laboratory 
tasks and natural settings, top-down expectations (i.e. what is likely to occur) are often 
confounded with top-down attention (i.e. what is relevant for task performance; Summerfield 
& Egner, 2016). While in our task movements of congruent fingers are just as probable as 
incongruent ones – making both types of event equally task-relevant – actors may have 
learned outside the laboratory to allocate top-down attention to congruent fingers as these are 
typically more relevant for controlling our actions (note of course that our logic also assumes 
that congruent movements are more expected due to learning outside of the experimental 
setting; see Introduction). This interpretation is particularly likely, given that when 
expectation and attention have been orthogonalised in the sensory cognition literature, the 
former has been found to generate biasing effects and the latter sensitivity effects (Wyart et 
al., 2012). Experiment 2 examined this possibility by orthogonally manipulating action-
outcome congruency and task relevance with a new sample. This was achieved by 
introducing two separate cues to the task: a number cue indicating which action participants 
should perform (thereby manipulating expectations about outcomes) and an orthogonal arrow 
 
Congruent 
  
Incongruent 
  
Experiment 1 1.42  
(.567) 
  
1.28  
(.588) 
  
 
Valid Neutral Invalid Valid Neutral Invalid 
Experiment 2 0.73 
 (.532) 
0.68  
(.539) 
0.63 
(.455) 
0.69  
(.536) 
0.59  
(.537) 
0.57  
(.521) 
Experiment 3 1.14  
(.743) 
1.05  
(.684) 
0.90 
(.590) 
1.14  
(.680) 
0.993  
(.591) 
0.923  
(.555) 
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cue indicating which outcomes will be relevant for perceptual decisions (indicating what 
participants should attend to).  
3.1. Methods 
3.1.1. Participants 
A new sample of 24 participants took part in Experiment 2 (17 female, 7 male, mean age =  
24.4 years, SD = 4.23). Data from one additional participant was lost due to a technical 
malfunction.  
3.1.2. Procedure 
The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 with the following changes. 
Trials began with the presentation of the neutral observed hand overlaid with an arrow cue. 
On 50% of trials the arrow cue was valid, pointing to the finger that was subsequently 
probed. On 25% of trials the cue was invalid, pointing to the finger that was not subsequently 
probed. On the remaining 25% of trials the cue was neutral, pointing to both fingers and 
indicating that they would be probed with equal probability. After 700 ms, an imperative cue 
(‘1’ or ‘2’) was presented above the arrow, indicating which action participants were required 
to perform (index or middle tap, respectively). After participants executed the correct action, 
the same stimulus sequence was triggered as in Experiment 1. Participants made the same 
detection judgements, but confidence judgements were not collected in this experiment. The 
experiment comprised 320 trials. Trial types were randomised across the experiment, and 
breaks were taken every 20 trials.  
3.2. Results and Discussion 
Signal detection theoretic measures of sensitivity and bias were calculated for each 
combination of action-outcome congruency (congruent, incongruent) and cue validity (valid, 
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neutral, invalid), and effects were evaluated using ANOVAs with the same factorial structure. 
Both analyses revealed an effect of cue validity, such that participants were more sensitive to 
(higher d’ - F2,46 = 4.246, p=.020, ηp2=.156; Table 1) and more liberal in reporting (lower c - 
F2,46 = 14.57, p<.001, ηp2=.388; Fig. 2) validly cued events – validating that participants used 
these cues to guide their attention (Hawkins et al., 1990). T-tests decomposing these cuing 
effect found that judgements were more sensitive when cues were valid than invalid (t23 = 
2.85, p=.009, dz = .581), though differences between sensitivity on valid and neutral cuing 
trials (t23 = 1.98, p=.059, dz = .404, BF01 = 1.36) or neutral and invalid trials (t23 = .937, 
p=.359, dz = .191, BF01 = 3.01) were non-significant. Comparable tests found observers were 
more liberal on validly cued trials than invalid ones (t23 = 4.11, p<.001 , dz = .838) and more 
liberal on neutrally cued than invalidly cued trials (t23 = 4.81, p<.001 , dz = .981), but 
differences between valid and neutral cuing trials were not significant (t23 = 1.28, p=.214, dz 
= .261, BF01 = 2.21). Moreover, effects of cue validity on judgement sensitivity did not 
interact with action-outcome congruency (F2,46 = .184, p=.833, ηp2=.008, BF01 = 7.19). 
Importantly, these analyses also found that participants were biased to report the presence of 
congruent action outcomes (F1,23 = 8.47, p=.008, ηp2=.269)2, and the magnitude of this bias 
did not interact with the focus of attention (F2,46 = 1,29, p=.286, ηp2=.053, BF01 = 5.95), 
suggesting that observers are biased to perceive predictable action outcomes irrespective of 
task relevance. However, there was no significant effect of congruency on sensitivity (F1,23 = 
1.70, p=.205, ηp2=.069, BF01 = 1.52). Therefore, when attention is orthogonally manipulated 
participants are still biased (lower c) to report the presence of congruent action outcomes. 
The effect of congruency on sensitivity was not detectable in Experiment 2, consistent with 
 
2 In Experiment 2 one participant was an outlier, showing an especially large action-induced bias (z score = 
3.76). Re-running the same analyses without data from this participant revealed the same effect of action 
congruency on c values (p=.003), the same correlation between congruency effects and modelled drift biases 
(r=-.924, p<.001) and did not change any other statistical patterns observed.  
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the possibility that this effect in Experiment 1 was determined by attentional processes 
(Wyart et al., 2012). 
 
4. Experiment 3: Controlling imperative-outcome mapping 
Experiment 3 investigated whether the congruency biasing effect was driven by expectations 
engendered by action or a mapping between imperative cues and stimulus types (1 = 
index/left; 2 = middle or right – a common mapping used in musical training). To rule out 
possible mapping between cues and outcomes, we compared one group of participants on an 
identical procedure as Experiment 2 to another group who received arbitrary shapes as 
imperatives rather than numbers (NB: no cue-outcome mapping can be learnt within the 
experiment as there is no within-experiment contingency).   
4.1. Methods 
4.1.1. Participants  
A new sample of 48 participants took part in Experiment 2 (33 female, 15 male, mean age = 
24.7 years, SD = 4.08), with 24 in each of the two groups. This provides the same power to 
detect the effect individually within each of the two groups as in Experiments 1 and 2, as well 
as enabling examination of the interaction according to cue type.   
4.1.2. Procedure 
One group of 24 participants completed a procedure identical to Experiment 2, where 
numbers (‘1’ or ‘2’) cued participants to perform index or middle finger actions. A separate 
group of 24 participants completed a near identical procedure, except circles and squares 
indicated to participants that they should execute index and middle finger movements. Half of 
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these participants received a circle-index / square-middle mapping and half received a circle-
middle / square-index mapping.  
4.2. Results and Discussion 
Measures of sensitivity and bias were calculated separately for each combination of 
experimental conditions and analysed with separate ANOVAs. Therefore, the only change 
with respect to Experiment 2 was the addition of a between-participants factor of cue type3. 
Greenhouse Geisser corrections were employed where appropriate. Participants were again 
more liberal in reporting the presence of congruent than incongruent action outcomes (F1,46 = 
14.59, p<.001, ηp2=.241; Fig. 2), and more liberal in reporting the presence of validly cued 
events (F2,92 = 5.062, p=.008, ηp2=.009). T-tests decomposing the attentional cuing effect on 
c values found that observers were more liberal on validly cued trials than invalid ones (t47 = 
2.73, p=.009 , dz = .394) and more liberal on neutrally cued than invalidly cued trials (t47 = 
2.47, p=.017, dz = .356), but differences between valid and neutral cuing trials were not 
significant (t47 = 1.19, p=.242, dz = .171, BF01 = 3.30).  
The effect of action-outcome congruency did not interact with the focus of attention (p=.080, 
ηp2=.025, BF01 = 3.81). Crucially, cue type (shapes vs numbers) also did not interact with the 
factor action-outcome congruency (F1,46 = 1.192, p = .281, ηp2=.025, BF01 = 2.61) or generate 
a three-way interaction with congruency and attentional focus (F2,92 = .234, p=.792, ηp2=.005, 
BF01 = 7.69. Indeed, separate analyses of the number (F1,23 = 7.50, p=.012, ηp2=.246) and 
shape cuing conditions (F1,23 = 8.02, p=.009, ηp2=.259) revealed a significant effect of 
 
3 In Experiment 3 one participant was an outlier, showing an especially large action-induced bias (z score = 
4.12). Re-running the same analyses without data from this participant revealed the same effect of action 
congruency on c values (p<.001), the same correlation between congruency effects and modelled drift biases 
(r=-.807, p<.001) and did not change any other statistical patterns observed. 
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congruency in both groups – underscoring that participants were more likely to report the 
presence of congruent action outcomes irrespective of cue type.  
Equivalent analyses of d’ found that judgement sensitivity again improved with valid cues – 
(F2,92 = 9.87, p <001, ηp2=.257; Table 1). T-tests decomposing this cuing effect found 
judgements were more sensitive when cues were valid compared to invalid (t47 = 4.49, 
p<.001, dz = .648), valid compared to neutral (t47 = 2.42, p=.019, dz = .349) and neutral 
compared to invalid (t47 = 2.07, p=.044, dz = .298). However, d’ was uaffected by action-
outcome congruency (F1,46 = .092, p=.763, ηp2=.002, BF01 = 7.63), nor did effects of 
relevance interact with congruency (F2,92 = .638, p=.531,  ηp2=.014, BF01 = 9.80). Neither the 
main effect of validity (F2,92 = .194, p=.824, ηp2=.004, BF01 = 11.7) nor any interaction with 
congruency (F2,92 = .542, p=.583 ηp2=.012, BF01 = 6.21) was affected by cue type.  
Experiment 3 therefore replicated the findings from Experiment 2 while controlling for the 
particular imperative mapping, suggesting that it was the action-based expectations that 
generated the biasing effects.  
5. Combined analysis 
No significant congruency effects on d’ were found in Experiments 2 and 3, in contrast to 
Experiment 1 where observers were more sensitive to the presence of congruent action 
outcomes. As noted, one plausible explanation for this discrepancy is that effects on 
sensitivity are driven by attentional mechanisms (see Wyart, Nobre & Summerfield, 2012) 
and sensitivity effects were correspondingly abolished when attention was orthogonally cued 
in Experiments 2 and 3. However, Bayes Factors suggested evidence for a null result was 
convincing in Experiment 3 (BF01 > 3) but indecisive in Experiment 2 (BF01 < 3). Combining 
data from Experiments 2 and 3 for greater precision, we found convincing evidence for the 
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absence of a congruency effect on d’ - t71 = 1.02, p = .312, dz = .120,  BF01 = 4.69 – 
suggesting that sensitivity effects were absent across the two experiments. 
6. Computational modelling: Which aspect of perceptual decision making is biased by 
action? 
We used computational modelling of participant choices and reaction-time distributions to 
pinpoint which aspect of perceptual decision making is biased by action. Drift diffusion 
models (DDMs) of perceptual decision making have enjoyed growing prominence in the 
cognitive sciences (Ratcliff, Smith, Brown & McKoon, 2016; see Fig. 3). These models 
assume that when making perceptual choices (e.g., was a stimulus present or not?), observers 
have an internal representation of ‘sensory evidence’ which is sampled by decision circuits. 
Decision circuits continuously sample from the representations of sensory evidence, and 
when the accumulated decision variable meets a response boundary (e.g. ‘respond present’), 
the appropriate response is triggered. The representation of sensory evidence is therefore 
separable from the representation of decisions about that evidence. 
There are two ways that the DDM could accommodate the action-induced bias found in 
Experiments 1-3. First, expectations during action could shift the starting point of the 
evidence accumulation process toward the ‘respond present’ decision bound (varying 
parameter z of the DDM; see Fig. 3a). Such effects are often thought to reflect biases in the 
decision circuits. For example, predictive cues can induce preparatory motor activity before a 
stimulus is presented (de Lange, Rahnev, Donner & Lau, 2013) and these starting point 
effects could operate even if participants were insensitive to the perceptual information (e.g., 
they closed their eyes). However, a second alternative is that action directly biases sensory 
representations, as though agents have selectively increased the gain (or ‘precision’) afforded 
to expected sensory signals (Friston, 2018). This kind of bias would manifest as an 
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asymmetric bias in the rate of evidence accumulation (Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, 
Boekel & Forstmann, 2012; ‘drift biasing’, affecting parameter db of the DDM; see Fig. 3b), 
because as the sensory evidence is sampled more it provides progressively more evidence in 
favour of the expected event.  
6.1. Methods 
To investigate whether either of these possibilities could account for the action-induced bias 
we observed in our experiments, we fit hierarchical DDMs to participant choice and reaction 
time data using the hDDM package implemented in Python (Wiecki, Sofer & Frank, 2013). 
In the hierarchical DDM, model parameters for each participant are treated as random effects 
drawn from group-level distributions, and Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
sampling is used to estimate group and participant level parameters simultaneously. 
We specified four different models for data in each experiment. 1) a null model where no 
parameters were permitted to vary between congruent and incongruent trials. 2) a start bias 
model where the start point of evidence accumulation (z) could vary on congruent and 
incongruent trials. 3) a drift bias model where a constant bias in evidence accumulation (db) 
could vary between congruent and incongruent trials. 4) a start + drift bias model where both 
parameters could vary. To improve model fits, all models in Experiments 2 and 3 also 
allowed global drift rate (but not drift bias – i.e., biases to drift asymmetrically towards 
present or absent decisions) to vary as a function of cue validity to account for the effect of 
attentional cues on d’ (Ratcliff et al., 2016). Varying drift rate (rather than drift bias) captures 
effects that reflect more reliable evidence accumulation to the appropriate response boundary 
(i.e., ‘respond present’ when stimuli are present and ‘respond absent’ when absent) and 
therefore accounts for sensitivity effects seen as a function of cue validity, rather than a 
biased accumulation toward one response boundary over another. In no model did we allow 
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drift rate to vary between congruent and incongruent trials, as this would amount to assuming 
that observers are generally more sensitive to all kinds of sensory evidence on congruent 
trials (e.g. higher d’) , rather than sensitising particular sensory channels that encode expected 
outcomes.  
All models were estimated with MCMC sampling with 30,000 samples (‘burn-in’=7500). 
Model convergence was assessed by inspecting chain posteriors and simulating reaction time 
distributions for each participant. Models were compared using deviance information criteria 
(DIC) as an approximation of Bayesian model evidence. Estimated parameters in each model 
were compared using the Bayesian significance test implemented in hDDM, which computes 
the posterior probability that group-level parameters differ across conditions. 
 
6.2. Results and Discussion 
Fitting the DDM to the behavioural data found – in all experiments – that the drift biasing 
model provided a better fit than the start biasing model, and that in Experiments 2-3 a model 
only implementing a drift bias outperformed a model implementing both biases (see Fig. 3c).  
Analysing modelled parameters revealed higher drift biases on congruent relative to 
incongruent trials (posterior probabilities that congruent db > incongruent db: Experiment 1 = 
0.819, Experiment 2 = 0.959, Experiment 3 = 0.899 – higher values indicate greater 
differences between conditions; Wiecki, Sofer & Frank, 2013). To confirm that these 
differences in drift bias explained the effect of expectations on perceptual decisions, we 
calculated and correlated the difference between drift bias parameters (congruent db – 
incongruent db) and the magnitude of the behavioural bias (congruent c – incongruent c) for 
each participant. This analysis revealed strong relationships within all three samples 
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(Experiment 1: r24=-.877, p<.001; Experiment 2: r24=-.973, p<.001; Experiment 3: r48=-.855, 
p<.001, see Fig. 3d).  
This modelling thereby suggests that action-induced biases were best accounted for by a 
sensory drift biasing mechanism – where observers are biased to accumulate sensory 
evidence in line with their expectations – rather than a change in later decision circuits.  
Fig 3. Illustration of how the DDM could explain action-induced biases, and results of computational modelling. 
a. For an unbiased decision process (black lines) sensory evidence integrates toward the upper response 
boundary when stimuli are present (solid lines) and toward the lower response boundary when stimuli are absent 
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(dotted lines). Baseline shifts in decision circuits could shift the start point of the accumulation process nearer to 
the upper boundary for congruent events (influencing the parameter z; blue lines - Start bias model). b. 
Alternatively, selectively altering the weights on sensory channels could bias evidence accumulation in line with 
expectations (influence parameter db; red lines – Drift bias model). c. Across all experiments the Drift bias 
model provided a better fit than the Start bias model (lower Deviance Information Criteria [DIC] indicates 
better model fit). d. Moreover, in each experiment there was a strong correlation between the drift bias values 
modelled to each participant and the empirical action-induced bias on c values. 
7. General Discussion 
Cognitive scientists have proposed models of perceptual prediction that disagree about how 
our expectations should shape what we perceive (Press, Kok & Yon, 2020b). Cancellation 
models influential in action control have suggested that agents are less likely to perceive the 
predictable consequences of their actions (Bays & Wolpert, 2007), in contrast to Bayesian 
models from the wider sensory cognition literature which suggest that observers weight 
perception towards prior knowledge (see de Lange, Kok & Heilbron, 2018; Press & Yon, 
2019).  The present experiments suggest that evidence accumulation is biased in line with 
expectations during action, such that observers are more likely to perceive the outcomes they 
expect. This pattern concords with Bayesian accounts of expectation developed in the wider 
sensory cognition literature, which assume observers increase the weight they give to 
expected inputs when making perceptual judgements. Biasing perceptual decisions in this 
fashion is an effective way to rapidly generate more veridical percepts from sensory signals 
corrupted by irreducible internal and external noise. While this process increases the 
likelihood that expected signals are detected (i.e. more hits), it also makes observers prone to 
hallucinate events when confronted with signal-like noise (i.e., more false alarms; Wyart et 
al., 2012), and therefore is thought to generate biasing rather than sensitivity effects – as 
observed here. Indeed, we found these action-induced biases in perception were dissociable 
from top-down attention, with orthogonal task-relevance cues altering judgement sensitivity. 
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This finding is in line with previous studies of expectation and attention outside of action 
contexts (Wyart et al., 2012), and perhaps therefore indicative of domain-general 
mechanisms.  
These patterns are consistent with findings of how previous decisions about sensations 
influence subsequent decisions (Talluri, Urai, Tsetsos, Usher & Donner, 2018), and with a 
recent fMRI study which found that expected action outcomes are more readily decoded from 
early and late visual brain areas (Yon, Gilbert, de Lange & Press, 2018). These neural effects 
are predicted by Bayesian models, but it has alternatively been suggested that effects of 
expectation in sensory brain areas could reflect feedback from decision-related areas in 
higher-level cortex that have no causal effect on perception (Bang & Rahnev, 2017; Choe, 
Blake & Lee, 2014). The current findings importantly indicate effects of action expectation 
on perception, and a corresponding drift biasing mechanism that is consistent with an early 
sensory biasing account.  
The predictive relationship exploited in these experiments – e.g. that observed index finger 
movements are an expected consequence of moving one’s index finger – is strong and stable. 
It reflects an expectation that is likely acquired through our extensive experience of 
controlling our actions (Hommel et al., 2001). However, we would predict that in principle 
the same underlying mechanisms operate when we acquire new predictions. In line with this 
assumption, our effects are akin to those found – outside of action settings – when 
participants learn within an experiment that colour cues predict the orientation of gratings 
(Wyart et al., 2012). The hypothesis that similar mechanisms operate when we acquire new 
predictions may appear inconsistent with previous conflicting findings when participants are 
presented with novel action-outcome mappings within an experiment. In an elegant training 
study, Cardoso-Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach and Waszak (2010) found evidence that 
participants are less sensitive to grating orientations ‘predicted’ by actions that had been 
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paired with the gratings during training, with no influence of actions on bias measures. 
However, sensitivity was especially high in this study, such that a bias towards perceiving the 
expected, accompanied by ceiling effects on the hit rate, would appear as a sensitivity 
reduction. Perhaps more importantly, this single study used a small sample and the findings 
may not replicate (Schwarz, Pfister, Kluge, Weller & Kunde, 2018). It may therefore be 
suggested that there was insufficient opportunity in this paradigm to acquire the action-
outcome mappings reliably. However, in principle, given sufficient opportunity for prediction 
acquisition, we would hypothesise prediction mechanisms to operate in a qualitatively similar 
fashion when predictions are both ‘old’ and ‘new’ (Dogge, Custers, Gayet, Hoijtink & Aarts, 
2019).  
This pattern of results is difficult to reconcile with cancellation models, and their central 
claim that observers are less likely to perceive the multisensory predictable consequences of 
their movements (Bays & Wolpert, 2007; Blakemore et al., 1998). For example, key support 
for cancellation models has come from studies that show predictable signals generated by 
action are perceived to be less intense than similar (i.e., unpredicted) events presented in the 
absence of action (Bays et al., 2005). These studies are in fact often difficult to interpret, 
because there are several differences between the predicted and unpredicted conditions. Most 
notably, many of the studies compare perception of ‘predicted’ self-generated events with 
perception of ‘unpredicted’ sensory events generated by external sources while participants 
themselves remain passive – or where the sensory and motor events overlap less due to 
temporal misalignment (Blakemore, Frith & Wolpert, 1999). This comparison is perhaps 
confounding the operation of expectation mechanisms with that of other processes (see Press, 
Kok & Yon, 2020a). For example, if conceptualising action as an additional task, classic 
working memory models would hypothesise reduced sensory processing when events are 
presented in combination with action (Baddeley, 1996). It is therefore difficult to isolate 
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effects of prediction mechanisms from those introduced by the dual- vs single-task design. 
The measures employed typically also cannot isolate perceptual effects from decisional 
biases (see Firestone & Scholl, 2016) or expectation from attention-based processes (see 
Summerfield & Egner, 2016).   
One explanation for the difference between the present and previous studies could be that we 
have examined visual action effects whereas much evidence to support cancellation comes 
from tactile paradigms (e.g., Juravle, McGlone & Spence, 2013; Juravle, Binsted & Spence, 
2017; Kilteni & Ehrsson, 2017). The models of which we are aware hypothesise similar 
operation of predictive Bayesian or Cancellation mechanisms across domains (Wolpert et al., 
2003; Brown et al., 2013), and there may be no reason to hypothesise distinct adaptive 
arguments for the sense of touch. However, touch may be influenced differently because of 
operation of additional generalised ‘suppression’ mechanisms. Such suppression mechanisms 
are thought to attenuate tactile sensations during action regardless of whether they are 
predicted effects of action or not and are thought to be mediated by spinal mechanisms (Seki 
& Fetz, 2012), and comparable mechanisms may similarly attenuate sensory processing in a 
non-predictive fashion across modalities in humans and other animals (Crapse & Sommer, 
2008). Importantly, recent experiments in touch suggest that when confounds related to 
sensory suppression are removed, action predictions may influence perception in a 
qualitatively similar fashion irrespective of sensory modality (Thomas, Yon, de Lange & 
Press, 2020).   
Nevertheless, there remain studies that are less prone to these alternative explanations and 
report ‘cancelled’ percepts for expected, relative to unexpected, action outcomes (e.g., 
Roussel, Hughes & Waszak, 2013; 2014). It is therefore important that future research 
unpacks the features that have driven previous reports of ‘cancellation’ – including the 
possibility that additional mechanisms are recruited as sensory processing unfolds (see Press, 
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Kok & Yon, 2020b). Specifically, some of us have recently proposed that the influence of 
expectation on perception may not be as simple as suggested in either Bayesian or 
Cancellation theories. Under this proposal, observers are initially biased towards perceiving 
expected sensory events, but any especially surprising inputs – likely relevant for model 
updating – are reactively upweighted (Press, Kok & Yon, 2020b). Such a reactive 
upweighting process only for a subset of ‘unexpected’ events is consistent with evidence 
from the learning and inference literature, and is in line with the proposed adaptive function 
of a cancellation mechanism – i.e., highlighting events that are informative to the organism. 
This account may explain some discrepancies in the literature – e.g., finding perceptual 
upweighting of rapid, punctate consequences of movement, in contrast with evidence for 
cancellation-like phenomena when action outcomes unfold dynamically (e.g., Lally, Frendo 
& Diedrichsen, 2011). Future studies should therefore establish whether expectation effects 
are modulated by the time at which perception is probed and the extent of the surprise elicited 
by an ‘unexpected’ stimulus – which is low with the barely detectable sensations used in the 
present signal detection task (Press, Kok & Yon, 2020b).  
The concept of cancellation has had a wide-ranging influence on research investigating the 
sense of agency and its aberration in psychiatric disease. For example, experiences of 
passivity in schizophrenia – where patients feel moved by an external force – have often been 
attributed to a failure of predictive cancellation, which causes self-produced action outcomes 
to appear unusually intense (Frith et al., 2000). However, our results suggest that 
sensorimotor predictions can increase the weight we give to expected sensory signals, which 
may suggest that these mechanisms contribute to the experience of agency in a different way. 
Specifically, biases towards perceiving expected outcomes may help observers to overcome 
sensory noise, giving us higher fidelity representations of our ongoing movements and their 
consequences. An inability to incorporate this kind of top-down knowledge into perceptual 
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estimates could leave agents with higher levels of uncertainty about their actions, leaving 
them vulnerable to developing the unusual beliefs that characterise psychosis (Fletcher & 
Frith, 2009).    
Important contributions to work on sensory prediction during action have also come from 
models of predictive processing and active inference developed in computational 
neuroscience (Friston, 2005). These models suggest that all aspects of perception, action and 
cognition arise as agents minimise the mismatch between their models of the extracranial 
world and incoming sensory evidence. Notably, this can be achieved either by using the 
evidence to update the models (i.e. perception) or by using action to change the evidence (i.e. 
to alter the world so it conforms to the model). In principle, the architecture of these models 
can account for the tendency of agents to up- or down-weight perception of predictable action 
outcomes through changes in the gain or ‘precision’ afforded to sensory evidence (Friston, 
2008; Yon, de Lange & Press, 2019). For example, researchers using this framework have 
suggested that sensory precision on certain channels is attenuated during action – explaining 
‘cancellation’ phenomena (Brown et al., 2013; Van Doorn et al., 2015) – while also 
suggesting that observers can increase the precision afforded to expected sensory signals – 
leading to ‘representational sharpening’ and biases toward perceiving what we expect 
(Friston, 2018).  However, while models of precision-weighting during action have important 
advantages over forward-model based accounts (e.g., where it has been difficult to specify 
computationally how predictions could ‘cancel’ sensory signals – see Brown et al., 2013), it 
remains the case that the precision on a sensory channel, and perception of a single event, 
cannot be up- and down-weighted simultaneously. This makes it difficult to use existing 
models of active inference to make precise predictions about those conditions under which 
perception of expected action outcomes should be enhanced and those where it should be 
attenuated. Our present findings may provide some constraints on such models that aid the 
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generation of more precise behavioural predictions in the future, as these results suggest that 
the precision afforded to visual channels encoding expected outcomes is augmented rather 
than attenuated – certainly when sensory events coincide temporally with action initiation. 
We hope that behavioural experiments like ours will play an important role in informing and 
constraining such models – elaborating a comprehensive account of how and why sensory 
gain is augmented and attenuated as we act upon the world around us.  
In conclusion, these results have shown that observers are biased towards perceiving the 
expected outcomes of their movements. These findings are difficult to reconcile with 
dominant cancellation accounts in action control, but concord well with normative models of 
Bayesian perceptual inference. Namely, increasing the weight we give to expected sensory 
signals may explain how we develop a largely veridical representation of our actions and 
their consequences in an inherently uncertain sensory world. 
 
Context 
Previous work in the lab has investigated whether specific types of sensorimotor 
representations – i.e., visual-motor mirror representations of action – are the product of 
domain-general statistical learning processes. After finding broad support for this idea (e.g., 
Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press & Heyes, 2014; Press et al., 2012), we began to investigate 
whether domain-general models can explain the functional influence of sensorimotor 
predictions on perception as well as the origin of such representations. In a recent 
neuroimaging study (Yon et al., 2018) we found representations in visual brain areas were 
reshaped toward expected action outcomes, which is more in line with domain-general ideas 
in the broader sensory cognition literature than the cancellation models in action. However, 
while these neuroimaging data are consistent with these models, it has been suggested that 
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expectation-related activity in sensory brain areas plays no causal role in determining what 
we perceive (Bang & Rahnev, 2017; Choe et al., 2014). Here we directly investigated how 
expectations influence the perception of action outcomes – finding evidence that we are 
biased toward perceiving expected action outcomes.     
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